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Abstract 
 
In recent decades, foreign assets and liabilities in advanced countries have 
grown rapidly relative to GDP, with the increase in gross cross-holdings far 
exceeding the size of net positions. Moreover, the portfolio equity and FDI 
categories have grown in importance relative to international debt stocks. In this 
paper, we describe the broad trends in international financial integration for a 
sample of industrial countries, and seek to explain the cross-country and time-series 
variation in the size of international balance sheets. We also examine the behavior of 
the rates of return on foreign assets and liabilities, relating them to ‘market’ returns . 
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International financial integration is increasing. Capital account restrictions have been 
lifted in many countries, other barriers to investing overseas are also being dismantled, and 
the level of activity in international financial markets has increased markedly over the last 
decades. This paper studies the dynamics of international financial integration using data 
on the level and composition of foreign assets and liabilities for a set of industrial 
countries. More specifically, we do the following:  
1.  Characterize the salient features of the increase in international financial integration 
during the past two decades; 
2.  Relate the growth in foreign asset and liability positions to potential “drivers” of 
integration (lifting of policy restrictions, increases in goods trade and output per capita, 
domestic financial developments, privatization programs, tax policy); 
3.  Study the behavior of rates of return on external assets and liabilities and relate them to 
differences in portfolio composition.  
With regard to the first point, we address several questions. Has the composition of 
country portfolios systematically changed over time? To what degree does the increase in 
external assets and liabilities reflect valuation effects due to the stock market boom of the 
1990s? What are the relative contributions of valuation changes (such as stock market and 
currency fluctuations) and new capital flows in determining gross international investment 
positions?  
With regard to the second point, we ask whether the time series and cross-sectional 
patterns in the levels and composition of cross-holdings can be systematically related to 
factors such as the increase in world trade in goods and services and rising income levels, 
as well as to “policy events” such as capital account liberalization; privatization programs; 
domestic financial liberalization; and other regulatory changes. -2-
With regard to the third point, we have documented in previous work the existence of 
substantial differences in rates of return on external assets and liabilities across countries 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002a and 2002b). For example, rates of return on assets have 
systematically exceeded those on liabilities for the US, so that the US investment income 
position stayed positive for a number of years even when the net foreign asset position had 
turned negative.  
Rates of return matter since they are the channel through which international investment 
positions provide risk sharing. The associated international transfers also are important in 
determining the trade balance and the real exchange rate. Moreover, the dynamics of asset 
and liability stocks depend on capital gains and losses in addition to new capital flows. 
This is especially important for countries holding large portfolio equity and FDI portfolios 
that may take most of their returns in the form of capital gains, which do not affect 
investment income flows, rather than yields (which do). In this paper,  we study the 
dynamic behavior of rates of return, the links between rates of return on the international 
investment position and various financial market returns, and the inter-relations between 
domestic and foreign real rates of return and real exchange rate fluctuations. 
This work has clear relevance for policymakers. Stocks of foreign assets and liabilities 
represent an important global linkage—shocks in country A have an impact on country B 
via revaluation and other wealth effects. This will be stabilizing to the extent that the 
international balance sheet hedges domestic risks, but potentially raises volatility if 
external investments leverage domestic positions. In addition, identifying the sources of 
the growth in world asset trade can contribute to an understanding of its sustainability and 
likely future trends. In this regard, growth that is related to the once-off elimination of 
barriers to asset trade will not persist but rather represents the transition to a higher level -3-
of activity. In contrast, growth that is linked to positively-trending variables such as output 
per capita and goods trade can be predicted to continue into the future. 
In our previous work, we have explored the determinants of net foreign asset positions 
along the time series dimension (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002a). However, we have 
largely examined other components (e.g. debt-equity ratios for foreign liabilities) in a 
purely cross-sectional manner (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001a, 2001b). Lane (2000) 
provides some evidence on the change in gross cross-holding positions over time for the 
OECD countries but does not try to explain the panel dynamics. The available time series 
data have increased substantially in recent years, with countries now reporting data on 
their external portfolios in much greater detail. 
In terms of empirical work on international financial integration, some other authors have 
looked at related questions. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) have attempted to date the 
integration of emerging market stock exchanges into the global market, using an asset 
price model. Henry (2000), Levine et al. (2000), Edison et al (2002), Edison and Warnock 
(2002) and O’Donnell (2002), amongst others, have looked at the impact of international 
financial integration on various indicators. Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) provide a wide-
ranging historical overview, including analysis of the long-run changes in gross asset 
trade. For Europe, Adam et al (2002) explore a wide range of measures of international 
financial integration. Finally, we note that such a study of the “growth in world asset 
trade” is complementary to the recent literature on the growth in world trade (Hummels et 
al 2001, Yi 2003).   
The empirical literature on the rates of return earned on foreign assets and liabilities is 
very small. Bond (1977), Sorensen and Yosha (1998) and Lane (2001) study the behavior 
of investment income flows but not the contribution of capital gains and losses, while 
Sorensen, Yosha and Wu (2002) also provide some indirect evidence on the role of -4-
portfolio equity holdings in international risk sharing. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a, 
2002b) provide some initial evidence on the behavior of overall rates of return. 
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. We discuss data issues and capture some 
basic facts about our data in Section 2. We examine the determinants of variation in the 
scale of international financial integration in Section 3. We turn to examining rates of 
returns and yields on foreign assets and liabilities in Section 4. Section 5 offers some 
conclusions. 
 
II.   DATA ISSUES AND BROAD TRENDS 
We study international financial integration using data on countries’ portfolios of external 
assets and liabilities—the so-called International Investment Position (IIP). These data 
summarize total holdings by domestic residents of financial claims on the rest of the 
world, and nonresidents’ claims on the domestic economy. Following the methodology of 
the Balance of Payments Manual 5 (IMF, 1993), external liabilities are divided into five 
main categories: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity investment, portfolio 
debt investment, other investment, and derivatives. Assets are instead divided into six 
categories: the same five as liabilities, plus official reserves. Table A1 summarizes country 
and period coverage for the main categories of external assets and liabilities. The main 
data source is the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistics, but we 
also made use of data from national sources. A data appendix describes data sources in 
more detail.  
 -5-
A.   Data Issues 
The methodologies used to construct data on external assets and liabilities can differ both 
across and within countries. For the purpose of cross-country comparisons, one 
particularly important factor in this regard is the methodology used to estimate the stock of 
FDI and portfolio equity investment, and in particular whether these stocks are evaluated 
at book or market value. Only few countries (United States, France, and Sweden) provide 
estimates of the stock of FDI both at book and market value.
1 Other countries provide only 
one set of FDI estimates, most at book value (Australia and Netherlands use market 
value). For portfolio equity investment, most countries provide estimates at market value 
(Canada, which uses book value, is the exception). Generally, book value estimates 
understate the market value of the underlying assets and liabilities. 
With regard to the time series dimension, problems can arise because of within-country 
changes in the classification of certain types of assets or liabilities. For example, for the 
earlier years of the sample portfolio debt investment holdings are included in other 
investment holdings in the United Kingdom. More generally, the breakdown of external 
assets and liabilities between different categories is available only partially, especially for 
the earlier years of the sample. 
When studying individual the dynamics of external holdings and rates of return, we have 
strived to use a data set as homogeneous as possible, taking into account both structural 
breaks and methodological differences in the calculation of assets and liabilities. 
                                                 
1 The United States provides estimates of FDI abroad and in the US at historical cost, 
current cost, and market value. For a discussion of the impact of different FDI valuation 
methods, see Pratten (1992) on the United Kingdom, and Eisner and Pieper (1991) on the 
United States. -6-
Nevertheless, heterogeneities in the data unavoidably remain—as we proceed, we point 
out the implications of such data problems for our analysis. 
 
B.   Broad Trends 
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where FA and FL refer to the stocks of aggregate foreign assets and liabilities, 
respectively.
2 Figure 1 plots the evolution of this ratio over the period 1984-2001 for a set 
of industrial countries. This ratio has increased by 250 percent over this period, with a 
marked acceleration during the 1990s.
3 This increase in financial linkages has not been 
uniform across countries: Figure 2 shows a rise in dispersion in this ratio across countries 
over this interval. 
Since international trade in debt instruments may be driven by special factors, we also 
consider an equity-based measure 
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where PEQA (L) and FDIA (L) are the stocks of portfolio equity and FDI assets 
(liabilities). In other words, GEQGDPis an indicator of the level of equity (portfolio and 
FDI) cross-holdings. Figure 3 shows that the growth in this ratio has been even more rapid 
than for IFIGDP—it more than tripled over 1983-2001.  
                                                 
2 See also Lane (2000a) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2002). The latter discuss the relative 
merits of this indicator versus other price-based measures of integration, as do Adam et al 
(2002). 
3 The decline during 2001 reflects the steep fall in world stock markets. -7-
One possible reason for this rise in international financial cross-holdings is the increase in 
international trade, which has also been substantial in recent decades. However, Figures 
2.4 and 2.5 show clearly that the increase in financial openness dwarfs the increase in 
goods’ trade. Figure 4 shows theIFI and GEQ measures as ratios to exports plus imports 
rather than GDP ( , IFITRADE GEQTRADE ). Both ratios show substantial increases over 
the period: in the aggregate, international asset trade has grown far more rapidly than 
goods trade by this measure. Figure 5 illustrates that this finding holds at the individual 
country level, by showing the relation between the percentage change in the financial 
openness to GDP ratio and the percentage change in the trade openness to GDP ratio 
during the period 1991-2001. Only for Canada (which measures portfolio equity at book 
value, and therefore underestimates external assets and liabilities) and Japan trade 
openness has increased more than financial openness.  
In theory, international financial integration may simply reflect financial deepening: in 
industrial countries, financial assets and liabilities increased much faster than GDP over 
the past two decades, and the share of external assets and liabilities in total financial 
holdings may thus have remained unchanged. Unfortunately the availability of financial 
balance sheets is limited, both along the cross-sectional and the time-series dimension.
 4 
Nevertheless, available data for the United Kingdom (since the early 1980s) and Belgium 
and Italy for the second half of the 1990s shows clearly an increase in the ratioof external 
financial holdings over total financial holdings (Figure 6). Another piece of evidence 
suggesting that increased international financial integration is more than the reflection of 
financial deepening comes from data on portfolio equity holdings. Figure 7 shows that the 
                                                 
4 Kraay et al (2000) calculate a measure of national net wealth, using estimates of physical 
capital stocks. However, measuring gross assets and liabilities is a yet more onerous task. 
See also Obstfeld and Taylor (2002). -8-
ratio of portfolio equity holdings by foreigners to stock market capitalization has increased 
over the past 10 years. Note that this ratio underestimates the increase in foreign equity 
holdings because it excludes the “controlling shares” of companies that are classified as 
FDI.  
In a similar vein, we next investigate the degree to which the value of international 
portfolios is related to the boom in equity valuations during the 1990s, rather than an 
increase in capital flows. Table 1 reports the change in external assets and liabilities 
between end-1995 and end-2000 (as a ratio of GDP in 2000), cumulative capital outflows 
and inflows during the same period, and, as residual, the part of the change in the external 
position not explained by capital flows. The table shows clearly the remarkable increase in 
the size of country external portfolios, and the magnitude of the underlying gross capital 
flows. The increase in external diversification is particularly high in financial centers such 
as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and small open economies such as the 
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, and is much faster than in previous years. Indeed, 
compared with the previous 5-year period (1990-95), gross capital flows more than 
doubled, both in absolute terms and as ratios of GDP.  
A second notable fact is the importance of capital gains and losses in explaining the 
dynamics of the external position. These are primarily due to exchange rate fluctuations 
and changes in stock market values, which were substantial during this period. In our 
sample, a remarkable case is Finland, where the increase in the market value of its equity 
liabilities (in particular Nokia, a stock widely held by non-residents) implied an increase in 
external liabilities unexplained by new inflows of over 100 percent of its GDP. The impact 
of capital gains and losses on the net external position, which can be derived by 
subtracting column (6) from (3), is even more substantial (in relative terms) than the 
impact on gross positions. -9-
 
III.   ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITIONS 
This section discusses theoretical determinants of international financial integration, and 
conducts a simple econometric analysis aiming at identifying the key factors driving 
international asset trade. 
  
A.   Conceptual Issues 
A natural benchmark in thinking about the level of international asset cross-holdings is the 
allocation that would hold under complete global financial market integration with no 
cross-border transactions costs. In such a world, each country would hold a very high level 
of foreign assets and liabilities, in line with full diversification. As a crude approximation, 
a country representing 1 percent of the world endowment would hold 99 percent of its 
wealth overseas and, in turn, 99 percent of its domestic tradable assets would be held by 
foreigners.
5 
Although the world is still far from this idealized state, it is logical to relate the cross-
country and time series variation in international portfolios to the corresponding dispersion 
in the (implicit and explicit) barriers to full integration and in the gains to international 
diversification. The level of international asset trade will also depend on the ‘tradability’ 
of domestic assets: factors that reduce domestic transaction costs also facilitate cross-
border asset trade. 
Martin and Rey (2000, 2001) provide theoretical models that address some of these issues. 
In their framework, investors are risk averse, the number of financial assets is endogenous, 
                                                 
5 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 5) for a textbook review of the theory of 
international financial trade. -1 0-
assets are imperfect substitutes, and cross-border asset trade entails transactions costs. 
Under these assumptions, a reduction in international transactions costs stimulates an 
increase in the demand for (and supply of) assets and an increase in asset prices, leading to 
higher cross-border diversification. 
As such, our empirical strategy is to identify a set of country characteristics that may 
influence the benefits to and costs of international asset trade. Most obviously, we 
consider the impact of controls on cross-border capital movements. If controls are binding, 
the level of international asset cross-holdings should increase if the capital account is 
liberalized. 
Second, we investigate the connection between trade in goods and services and trade in 
assets. Goods trade may matter for several reasons. First, much goods trade directly entails 
corresponding financial transactions (e.g. trade credit and export insurance). Second, 
following Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), there is a close connection between the gains to 
international financial diversification and the extent of goods trade: trade costs create an 
international wedge between marginal rates of substitution and hence limit the gains to 
asset trade. Third, goods trade and financial positions are jointly determined in some 
situations, as is often the case with FDI, given the importance of intra-firm intermediates 
trade. Finally, openness in goods markets may increase the willingness to conduct cross-
border financial transactions, reducing financial home bias (a ‘familiarity’ effect).
6 
 Income per capita may also influence the propensity to engage in international asset trade. 
To the extent that higher income per capita is associated with lower risk aversion and 
international investments are perceived as riskier than domestic alternatives, it may also 
raise international asset trade. If participation in foreign asset markets involves fixed costs 
                                                 
6For Ireland, Honohan and Lane (2000) show that the bilateral pattern of goods trade 
explains the bilateral pattern of portfolio equity investment very well. -1 1-
(e.g. learning costs), this may provide another reason why international cross-holdings 
might rise with income levels. The Martin-Rey framework also naturally delivers such a 
positive relation. 
The size of the domestic financial sector plausibly facilitates international asset trade in 
several ways.
7 Domestic financial intermediaries that also distribute international assets 
offer a local channel by which investors can gain foreign exposure. Exposure to domestic 
financial markets may also increase the desire for international diversification. On the 
liability side, an extensive financial infrastructure is attractive to foreign investors. 
However, a substitution effect may also operate: by necessity, domestic agents will have to 
invest on foreign markets if the domestic financial sector is underdeveloped. The quality 
of domestic financial regulation may also be important: foreign investors will stay away 
from markets that do not protect their interests. 
Tax policy may also influence the level of international cross-holdings. Firm assets may 
be shifted to countries with low corporate income tax rates. Moreover, such a regime will 
also attract international financial intermediaries engaged in offshore financial 
transactions. In addition, at a household level, high tax rates on investment income will 
stimulate the growth of offshore savings vehicles, if overseas investments can be more 
easily hidden from domestic tax authorities.
8  
These factors may not have uniform effects on the different components of the 
international balance sheet. For instance, if the greatest barriers to trade have been with 
                                                 
7 At this point, we are not attempting to establish lines of causality: some other studies in 
fact have tried to make a link running from external liberalization to domestic financial 
development. See, for example, Klein and Olivei (2000). 
8 See also Grilli (1990). This can directly create two-way financial trade if foreign loans 
can be raised on the back of these offshore assets. For instance, such round-tripping was 
popular in Ireland during the 1980s. -1 2-
respect to more complex and riskier assets (ie portfolio equity and FDI), then we may 
expect that cost-reducing steps have a larger impact on these components. 
 
B.   The Empirical Specification 
In line with the discussion in the previous subsection, we attempt to empirically identify 
the factors underlying the changing scale of international financial integration over time 
and across countries. Given the lack of firm theoretical priors and the sparse prior 
literature, this is intended to be an exploratory exercise. 
We construct a panel data set for 18 OECD countries over 1978-2001 and consider 
averaged data over six time periods: 1978-81, 1982-1985; 1986-1989; 1990-1993; 1994-
1997; and 1998-2001. The basic panel specification in Table 2 is 
  () * * ( ) it i it it it IFIGDP X Z α γβ ε ∆= + + ∆ +  (3) 
where we relate the growth in international financial integration to a set of country- and 
time-varying determinants  , it it X Z . We first difference the data to take into account the 
non-stationarity of the levels of IFIGDPand some of the regressors.
9 We allow for a 
country-specific intercept, to allow for country-specific trends in the level of financial 
integration.
 10 Accordingly, we conduct fixed-effect least squares estimation (with White-
corrected standard errors).  
We begin in Table 2 by examining IFIGDP. In Table 3, we restrict attention to the 
volume of asset trade in portfolio equity and FDI (GEQGDP). Finally, in Table 4 we 
examine the determinants of the composition of international balance sheets, as measured 
                                                 
9 That is, we look at the change in the average value of IFIGDPbetween 1978-81 and 
1982-85. 
10 We also tested for time fixed effects but these were jointly insignificant. -1 3-
by the shares of equity instruments (both portfolio and FDI) in foreign assets and liabilities 
(GEQSHARE). 
The first variable we include in the list of regressors is a capital account liberalization 
index EXTLIB. It is the period-average value of an index of capital account restrictions, 
ranging from 0-4, with a score of 4 indicating complete liberalization. It is based on data 
constructed by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and updated by Mody and Murshid 
(2002).
11 To allow for gradual adjustment in stocks to the lifting of controls, we lag this 
variable in the regressions: the average value in 1978-81 is used for the time period 1982-
85 and so on.  
Our second regressor is trade openness, defined as the sum of exports plus imports relative 
to GDP (TRADE).
12 Our third regressor, the (log) level of GDP per capita, is included to 
allow for a systematic relation between cross-border financial activity and the level of 
development. We also consider three indicators of domestic financial development, 
potentially an important factor in driving international asset trade: the ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP (FINDEPTH); the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
(STKCAP); and the ratio of cumulative privatization revenues to GDP (CUMPRIVAT).
13 
The latter is included to address whether the sale of state-owned assets has been an 
                                                 
11 Edison and Warnock (2002) construct a capital controls measure based on restrictions of 
access to equity holdings, but this is designed for emerging market economies rather than 
the industrial economies in our sample. 
12 The theory discussed in the previous section indicates that there should be a direct 
relation between trade and financial integration. At a bilateral level, it is interesting also to 
consider the extent to which ‘gravity’ equations explain financial trade as compared to 
goods trade. See Portes and Rey (2002) and Devereux and Lane (2003) on the 
determinants of bilateral financial flows. 
13 FINDEPTH is drawn from Beck et al (1999); STKCAP was kindly provided by Hali 
Edison; CUMPRIVAT is based on OECD data. -1 4-
important driver of international financial integration.
14 All of these variables are in the set 
it Z  and are included in the specification in first differences. 
For a subset of fourteen countries, we also explore the role played by corporate tax 
policies, by including in the regression a measure of the average effective corporate 
income tax rate (TAXRATE).
15 A favorable tax regime may stimulate FDI flows and also 
encourage financial transactions between host and parent companies: this variable is also 
first differenced. Finally, we also include a dummy variable for the introduction of insider 
trading laws (PROTECTION).
16 The insider-trading variable, which is entered in levels, 
can proxy for the extent and quality of regulation of the domestic financial system.  
Finally, we have also explored (but do not report) the impact of some other potential 
determinants, such as country size and telecommunications infrastructure: the former was 
always insignificant and did not alter the other results; the latter data are available for only 
a small number of countries.  
 
C.   Results 
Table 2 shows the results in explaining  IFIGDP ∆  for a range of specifications. In column 
(1), we just include the EXTLIB variable: it is positive and significant but explains only a 
small fraction of the variation in gross asset trade. Once we include other regressors, 
EXTLIB no longer has independent explanatory power.  
                                                 
14 If a privatized state firm is floated on the domestic stock market, it will be picked up by 
the STKCAP variable. However, private sales to foreign investors would not be captured in 
that index. 
15 This variable is constructed by Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) and 
Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002). 
16 This dummy variable is developed by Bhattacharya and Douak (2000) and Bekeart et al 
(2001). -1 5-
We add TRADE to the specification in columns (2)-(7): it is positive and highly significant 
throughout, and it improves the overall explanatory power substantially. The average 
TRADE coefficient of 3.7 in columns (2)-(7) indicates a strongly leveraged association: a 
10 percentage point increase in the trade to GDP ratio is associated with a 37 percentage 
point increase in IFIGDP.  
In columns (3)-(7), we add GDP per capita to the set of regressors. It enters positively and 
is highly significant across the specifications: a one percent increase in GDP 
raisesIFIGDPby 2.5 percentage points on average. 
We add FINDEPTH and STKCAP to the set of regressors in columns (4)-(7). The point 
estimate for FINDEPTH is always positive and is marginally significant in column (7), 
while STKCAP is quite important throughout: there is a strong positive correlation 
between an open capital account and a large domestic stock market. The overall 
explanatory power of the specification rises to 0.69 once these variables are included. In 
part, of course, there is a mechanical relation in that rising stock market indices increase 
both STKCAP value and the value of foreign equity liabilities in IFIGDP. 
The cumulative privatization variable actually enters with a negative sign in columns (5)-
(7), and is significant in the latter two regressions. This suggests that privatization may 
actually lead to a substitution away from foreign assets, which is especially plausible if the 
privatization process favors domestic investors.  
The TAXRATE variable is included in columns (6)-(7), at the cost of a reduction in the 
number of observations. It turns out to be unimportant in explaining variation in the level 
of international financial integration. In addition, the PROTECTION variable is not 
significant in column (7).  
We turn to the measure of cross-border equity holdings GEQGDP in Table 3. These are an 
increasingly important component of total international financial holdings, with their -1 6-
median value rising from 0.16 in 1982-85 to 0.36 in 1998-2001. Column (1) shows that 
EXTLIB has some limited explanatory power in explaining GEQGDP, but its individual 
significance is lost in columns (2)-(7).  As in Table 2, TRADE is always highly significant: 
moving from column (1) to column (2) also increases explanatory power from 0.12 to 
0.31. The average point estimate for TRADE is now 1.8, about ½ of its size in Table 2. 
Again, higher output per capita is significantly associated with an increase in external 
equities cross-holdings across columns (3)-(7). 
Explanatory power sharply rises to 0.89 in column (4) once domestic financial market 
variables are included. STKCAP continues to exert a very strong positive influence: a 10 
percentage point increase is associated with a 9.2-9.4 percentage point increase in 
GEQGDP. The smaller point estimates as compared to Table 2 indicates that a higher 
value of STKCAP is also associated with a rise in debt cross-holdings. As in Table 2, the 
coefficient on CUMPRIVAT is negative, while neither TAXRATE nor PROTECTION are 
important. Overall, countries less open to trade, with shallow domestic financial markets, 
and large-scale privatization activities have smaller international cross-holdings.  
We turn to the equity share in total external holdings (GEQSHARE) in Table 4.
 17  The 
results here are generally weaker than for the aggregate volume measures in Tables 2 and 
3. Not surprisingly, STKCAP again exerts a significantly positive influence; the overall 
explanatory power also rises from 0.19 to 0.53 once the financial variables are included. 
Another other notable finding is that FINDEPTH exerts a significantly negative influence 
on the equity share: a reasonable interpretation is that FINDEPTH disproportionately 
increases international trade in debt instruments. Finally, columns (6)-(7) show that 
                                                 
17 In results not reported, and available upon request, we also examined separately the 
equity ratios for the asset and liability sides of the international balance sheet, and the ratio 
of portfolio equity liabilities to domestic stock market capitalization. For the latter, an 
increase in goods trade is associated with a rise in the ratio. -1 7-
CUMPRIVAT has a significantly positive impact on GEQSHARE: the contrast with the 
result in column (5) is entirely driven by the change in sample size, due to the lack of tax 
data for some countries.
18 
In summary, this section has investigated the covariates of the growth in international 
financial integration. We have shown that variables such as trade openness, GDP per 
capita, and stock market capitalization are quite successful in ‘explaining’ the variation 
over time in the degree of international financial integration. Clearly, a future goal is to 
better establish lines of causality between these variables and our measures of external 
financial activity. 
 
IV.   ANALYSIS OF RATES OF RETURN 
In this section, we investigate the rates of return earned on foreign assets and liabilities. 
First, we describe the broad patterns in the data. Second, we ask whether the rates of return 
on foreign assets and liabilities are well tracked by various market indices.
19 Third, we 
examine whether the pattern of international investment indeed contributes to risk 
diversification. Finally, we explore the co-movement between local and foreign real rates 
of return and real exchange rates.  
 
                                                 
18 These are Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand. 
19 For instance, if a country allocates its equity investment across countries in proportion 
to relative stock market capitalizations, the rate of return on foreign equity assets would 
just follow a global market index. -1 8-
A.   Conceptual Issues 
Consider the ex-post real return (on foreign assets or liabilities) in domestic currency and 
in US currency. For country i, these are statistically linked by the rate of bilateral real 
appreciation vis-à-vis the US 
 
1







+≡ +  (4) 
where  ()
US
it it rr is the real return in US dollars (domestic currency) and rer is the bilateral 
CPI-based real exchange rate between the domestic currency and the US dollar. Let us 
consider the determinants of local currency real returns. Statistically, the aggregate return 
on the (asset or liability) position is a weighted sum of the returns on the various 
components of the investment position
20 
  it ij ijt
j
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It follows that the aggregate rate of return depends on (i) the returns in each investment 
category; and (ii) the proportions invested in the different components. We can model the 
former as depending on some common country component, plus an idiosyncratic factor to 
the extent that the investment pattern deviates from overall market patterns 
 
*
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For example, the return on portfolio equity liabilities will equal the return on the domestic 
stock market index if foreign investors just ‘hold the market’ but will differ if foreign 
investors choose a different portfolio composition.
21 Similarly, the return on foreign 
                                                 
20 In this setup, we assume time-invariant weights for convenience. 
21 One could in turn attempt to model the overall domestic return in a given asset category 
as a function of national macroeconomic variables. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) for 
an illustration with respect to interest rate determination. -1 9-
portfolio equity assets will deviate from the return on a ‘global’ stock market index to the 
extent that a country pursues an idiosyncratic investment strategy for the foreign 
component of its portfolio. 
In addition, we consider the co-movement between the rate of return on foreign assets and 




i ikt ijt rr α βν =+ + (7) 
If  1 β = , holding foreign assets provides no diversification against fluctuations in  
domestic financial returns. The weaker is the positive co-movement, the greater is the 
scope for risk-sharing.
22  
Third, we consider the relations between domestic- and dollar-based ex-post real returns 
and the real exchange rate. Go back to an approximation of the identity (4) 
 
US
it it it rr d r e r =+  (8) 
where  it drer  is the rate of real appreciation vis-à-vis the US. If returns were entirely driven 
by ‘domestic’ factors (orthogonal to exchange rate movements), the domestic real return 
and the real exchange rate would be uncorrelated and real exchange rate movements 
would fully pass through into dollar real returns. If instead returns were entirely driven by 
‘external’ factors, the correlation between the dollar real return and the real exchange rate 
would be zero and real exchange rate movements would fully pass through into domestic 
real returns.
23 
                                                 
22 If markets are not integrated, a low co-movement in returns may simply reflect the 
absence of common pricing factors. We checked our results using only a shorter sample of 
more recent data and the findings were broadly similar.  
23 An interesting general question, which is outside the scope of this paper, is how real 
exchange rate movements influence ex-post returns. (Of course, in terms of ex-ante 
returns, expectations of real exchange rate movements will drive a wedge between 
domestic and foreign returns but this link may be broken by ex-post shocks.) The relation 
depends on whether returns on assets/liabilities are primarily based on domestic or 
(continued) -2 0-
B.   Data Issues on Rates of Return 
In previous work (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002a, 2002b) we documented the importance 
of differences in rates of return for explaining the dynamics of net external positions. 
Three basic stylized facts emerged from the analysis: first, rates of return on both assets 
and liabilities tended to be high, easily exceeding countries’ growth rates; second, cross-
country differences in rates of return were  substantial, and third, some countries exhibited 
substantial differences between returns on external assets and liabilities. One classical 
example is the United States, which according to IIP data has been a debtor country since 
1989, but its investment income position turned negative only in 1998.  
In this section, we attempt to explain the behavior of the rates of return on foreign assets 
and liabilities. We use IMF balance of payments statistics data on interest earnings and 
payments on external holdings, together with data on international investment positions 
and on capital flows, to construct measures of yields and rates of return on external assets 
and liabilities as well as, where possible, on their sub-components. We then assess the 
degree to which these yields and returns can be explained by ‘market’ rates of return, 
which we construct using information on the composition and geographical allocation of 
external assets and liabilities. 
                                                                                                                                                   
external factors. The mechanics are most direct in the case of an unindexed nominal asset, 
where the impact of exchange rate movements on ex-post returns depends on whether it is 
denominated in domestic currency or foreign currency. Similarly, the domestic currency 
return on an unhedged foreign currency nominal asset or liability is negatively related to 
real appreciation. For positions denominated in domestic currency, there is no mechanical 
relation. On the one side, real appreciation may proxy for good fundamentals (if not 
captured elsewhere in the regression) and so be associated with high domestic currency 
returns; real appreciation also boosts profits by lowering the costs of imported inputs if 
these are priced in foreign currency. On the other hand, real appreciation may reduce 
returns by a loss of competitiveness, or by lowering the terms of trade if local currency 
pricing in good markets prevails. -2 1-
Let investment income receipts in US dollars related to asset-type X in year t be 
X
t IC (where IC stands for income credit) and investment income payments be
X
t ID  (where 
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= , where  XA( XL) are the country’s stocks of external 
X-type assets and liabilities, respectively. 
The year t capital gain on asset X is given by the difference between the change in the 
stock of X between t and t-1 and the underlying flow x during year t, divided by the initial 
























= . Finally, the nominal rate 
of return on assets is  (1 )(1 ) 1
Xx X
tt t ic yc kc =+ + − , and on liabilities 
(1 )(1 ) 1
Xx X
tt t id yd kd =+ + − . Real yields and real rates of return are obtained by deflating 
nominal US dollar returns by the US rate of inflation. Nominal and real rates of return in 
domestic currency are obtained using the same methodology, but with all variables 
measured in domestic currency.
24 
The data difficulties in undertaking this type of study are substantial. These relate in 
particular to measurement error problems for balance-of-payments-derived yields and 
rates of return, and to lack of information concerning the currency composition of external 
assets and liabilities. We discuss these difficulties in turn.  
Measurement error problems in deriving yields and rates of return from balance of 
payments data can arise from several sources: 
                                                 
24 Stocks are converted into domestic currency using the end-of-period exchange rate and 
flows using the period-average exchange rate, following the balance of payments 
convention.  -2 2-
•  Re-classification of external assets and liabilities items between different 
categories. For example, in Swedish data for 1997 securities issued abroad by 
residents—previously recorded as other investment liabilities—were re-classified 
as portfolio debt liabilities. 
•  Recording of interest receipts and payments in balance of payments accounts. For 
example, several countries classify investment income data in only two categories, 
FDI and “other,” where the second category also includes income on portfolio 
assets. In addition, in a few countries interest receipts and payments appear to be 
overestimated for some years. 
25  
•  Valuation of FDI and portfolio equity holdings. Most countries record FDI stocks 
at book value, but a few use market values. Using the former will imply in general 
higher FDI yields (because the outstanding stock of assets is smaller) but lower 
capital gains. The problem for the valuation of portfolio equity assets and liabilities 
is less severe, because most countries record these stocks at market value (the 
exception being Canada).  
•  Breaks in the data series for the variables used in the calculations. These breaks 
may relate to changes in the methodology of estimation (for example, from book to 
market value).  
                                                 
25 These problems, which seem to affect gross rather than net investment income flows, 
may relate to the recording of receipts and payments associated with derivatives’ 
operations or with nonresident transactions. These entail higher recorded interest receipts 
and payments, classified in either the portfolio or the ‘other investment’ categories. 
Examples include the data for Denmark (1991-1997), France (1990-1993), and Japan 
(1991-1995).  -2 3-
Problems in constructing “benchmark” portfolios arise because of the scarcity of data 
on the currency composition of external portfolios, as well as on the geographical 
allocation of external assets.
 26 In general, constructing benchmark yields and rates of 
return is easier for external liabilities than it is for external assets. For example, domestic 
stock market returns provide a reasonable benchmark for returns on portfolio equity 
liabilities. Benchmark yields and returns on debt instruments are more difficult to 
construct, in the absence of information on the currency of denomination. Taking into 
account these constraints, we have proceeded as follows.  
•  For portfolio equity liabilities, we use as a benchmark for returns (measured in 
US$) the total returns index from the domestic stock market, constructed by 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI).  
•  For portfolio equity assets, we make use of two alternative indices.  
a)  The MSCI world stock price index—a valid proxy for capital gains if  all 
countries allocate their external equity holdings in shares reflecting the world 
portfolio. Clearly this index cannot contribute to explaining cross-country 
heterogeneity in rates of return on portfolio equity assets, except for countries 
with a significant weight in the world index, such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan. 
                                                 
26 Significant progress in this area has been made in recent years. For example, the 1997 
IMF Portfolio Survey provides data on the geographical allocation of portfolio investment 
assets for 29 countries. A new, more comprehensive survey is currently being conducted. 
Also, countries such as Australia, Sweden, and the United States provide data on the 
currency composition of external holdings. -2 4-
b)  The weighted average of stock returns on individual markets, as reported by 
MSCI, where the weights reflect the country’s allocation of portfolio equity 
assets reported in the IMF 1997 Portfolio Survey.   
•  For FDI liabilities, we use the same indices as for equity liabilities. 
•   For FDI assets, we construct the rate of return by using a weighted average of stock 
returns on individual markets, where the weights reflect the geographical allocation 
of FDI assets as reported by the OECD.  
•  For debt liabilities, which include portfolio debt and other investment, we use 
domestic bond returns from Global Financial data. We also compare yields with 
domestic short-term and long-term interest rates (from the OECD database).  
•  For debt assets, we construct several indices: 
a)  A weighted return and yield on a foreign bond portfolio, where weights are 
obtained from the 1997 IMF Portfolio Survey, bond returns from Global 
Financial Data, and interest rates from the OECD.  
b)  A weighted yield on a foreign debt portfolio, where weights are obtained from 
BIS data on the geographical allocation of bank assets, and interest rate data 
are from the OECD.  With the BIS data, we are also able to take into account 
the fraction of foreign loans that are denominated in domestic currency versus 
foreign currency. 
These indices can help us shed light on the degree to which rates of return and yields on 
external assets and liabilities can be explained by market developments and investment 
patterns. Obviously, even if the rate of return on individual asset categories, such as debt 
and portfolio equity, were the same for all countries, cross-country differences in overall 
rates of return may still arise because of differences in the composition of country 
portfolios. Indeed, one important ‘candidate’ for the explanation of the stylized facts listed -2 5-
at the beginning of this section is the increasing importance of portfolio equity and FDI 
stocks in international portfolios. The increase in world stock market values during the 
1990s has implied substantial capital gains and rates of return on these assets, thus 
potentially explaining the high measured rates of return on external assets and liabilities. 
Differences in countries’ external holdings of equity-type instruments can also account for 
cross-country heterogeneity in rates of return.  
Finally, differences between yields on external assets and external liabilities can be due to 
the different weight in the two categories of equity-type instruments. Most of the return on 
equity and FDI instruments comes through capital gains, and yields are relatively small. 
However, investment income flows (that enter in the current account) include only yields, 
but do not include capital gains. As a result, ceteris paribus yields on external assets will 
tend to be higher in countries with more debt-type instruments in their portfolio.
27 A 
corollary of this observation is that the current account is becoming less and less indicative 
of changes in countries’ external position, since it ignores such valuation changes.  
 
C.   Empirical Specification 
In order to understand the time-series behavior of rates of return on foreign assets and 




i ijt ijt rr α γε = ++  (9) 
where  i α  is a country fixed effect, 
BOP
ijt r  is the rate of return on a given category of the 
international investment position, as calculated from the balance of payments data and 
M
ijt r  
                                                 
27 For example, Italy is a creditor country where investment income payments are higher 
than receipts. This is accounted for by the fact that Italy’s external assets have a larger 
share of equity-type instruments than Italy’s external liabilities.   -2 6-
is an estimated rate of return on some observable market portfolio.
28  
As was outlined in the previous subsection, we consider two market portfolios in tracking 
the returns on foreign portfolio equity assets: (a) the MSCI world stock return index; and 
(b) an index based on the portfolio weights reported in the 1997 IMF Portfolio Survey.
29 
We use the national domestic stock market return index in tracking the rate of return on 
foreign portfolio equity liabilities.  
To explain the rate of return on FDI assets and liabilities, we again use the MSCI return 
indices. For FDI assets, we also use partner countries’ stock market returns weighted using 
relative shares in overseas FDI positions, as reported in the OECD International Direct 
Investment Statistical Yearbook. We report results separately for countries reporting FDI 
at book and at market value, and we expect stock market return indices to do a better job 
in the latter case. 
We aggregate data from the portfolio bond and other debt categories into a single 
aggregate rate of return on debt. As explained in the previous subsection, for foreign debt 
assets we consider a weighted index of bond returns, based on bond holdings as reported 
in the 1997 IMF Portfolio Survey, with bond returns on ten-year government bonds taken 
from Global Financial Data.  
We also consider the yields on the debt component. For the yield on debt assets, we 
consider two sets of portfolio weights: (i) bond weights from the IMF portfolio survey; 
                                                 
28 The equation allows for a non-unitary coefficient on the market return index, since the 
market return and the omitted idiosyncratic element may be correlated. 
29 For US and UK, we use the MSCI indices that exclude these countries respectively. 
With respect to the IMF Portfolio Survey, we calculate portfolios on the basis of 
investment positions in six major markets: the US, the UK, Japan, France, Germany and 
Italy. These portfolio shares only refer to end-1997: we make the heroic and obviously 
imperfect assumption that these weights are good indicators for the other years in our 
sample. -2 7-
and (ii) weights based on the geography of cross-border bank assets, taken from the BIS.
30 
We use  long-term interest rates, based on OECD data—results are analogous if we use an 
average of short- and long-term rates. For debt liabilities, we track yields and returns with 
the long-term domestic interest rate and the domestic bond return, respectively.
31 
We also investigate whether the returns on foreign assets provide diversification against 









BOP FA r  is the return on some category of foreign assets and 
M
ikt r  is the return on 
some category of foreign liabilities. 
Finally, we address the relation between rates of return and real exchange rate movements. 
As discussed in the previous subsection, the co-variation between real returns in home 
currency and foreign currency depends on their correlations with real exchange rate 
fluctuations. For this reason, we report these correlations
32 
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it it it it it it rr rd r e r u s r d r e r u s ρρ ρ  (11) 
D.   Results 
As a prelude to the investigation of returns on individual investment categories, we first 
show that the aggregate returns on foreign assets and liabilities depend on the composition 
of the international balance sheet between equity- and non-equity components. Figures 8 
                                                 
30 For the latter, we know the relative proportions of lending in domestic currency versus 
other currencies. Accordingly, the yield on foreign assets depends on the domestic interest 
rate and on the weighted average of foreign interest rates. 
31Since some debt liabilities are contracted in foreign currencies, this will be an imperfect 
approach. Of course, this consideration is much more important for emerging market 
economies, not included in this paper. 
32 This approach is simplified by the assumption that dollar real returns are a good 
representation of the ‘external’ market. -2 8-
and 9 plot average returns and the share of equity in the external portfolio over 1997-2001 
for a cross-section of countries. In both cases, the figures show a strongly positive relation 
between the equity share and the average return—a larger equity share is associated with a 
higher return. Second, in terms of data properties, we record in Figures 10 and 11 that 
returns are substantially more variable than yields for both foreign assets and liabilities, 
providing the example of the United States—plots for other countries are similar.  
 In term of time-series behavior, Tables 5A and 5B report fixed-effects regressions over 
1983-2001 for the specification given in equation (9), for foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities respectively.
33 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5A consider the returns on portfolio 
equity foreign assets. The MSCI world return index explains the dynamics of these returns 
quite well. Adjusting for geographical differences in overseas investment patterns (column 
2) does not improve performance. A possible explanation is that the geographical weights 
are based on end-1997 positions, and therefore this index may be compromised due to 
time-varying portfolio weights; in addition, foreign investors may hold equity baskets in a 
given country that differ in composition from its broad market index. 
Columns (3)-(4) repeat these exercises for returns on FDI assets at book value, and 
columns (5)-(6) for returns on FDI at market value. Again, the explanatory power of the 
MSCI index is as good as the geographically-weighted index—as expected, both track 
returns on FDI at market value much better than returns at book value. Column (7) shows 
that the weighted foreign bond return explains about ¼ of the overall variance in debt asset 
returns. Both weighted interest rate measures track the yield on foreign debt assets quite 
closely (columns 8 and 9).  
                                                 
33 The countries are Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Canada 
was dropped from the equity regressions, since it measures its foreign equity assets only at 
book value. Other countries were excluded due to data limitations. -2 9-
We turn to the returns on foreign liabilities in Table 5B. Column (1) shows that the return 
on foreign portfolio equity liabilities co-moves strongly with the domestic stock market 
index return and this specification has high explanatory power. This close relationship is a 
demonstration of international risk sharing in action: selling shares to foreign investors 
hedges the risk of fluctuations in domestic equity returns. Once again, the domestic stock 
return explains returns on FDI at market value (column 3) much better than returns on 
book-value FDI (column 2). In regard to debt liabilities, domestic bond returns explain 
over ⅓ of returns on debt liabilities (column 4), and the yield on foreign debt liabilities is 
well tracked by domestic interest rates (column 5). 
The analysis of returns on foreign assets is further extended in Table 6 by comparing 
returns on foreign assets to domestic market returns. We consider the aggregate return on 
foreign assets in columns (1)-(2). The first specification shows that the return on foreign 
assets positively and significantly co-varies with the domestic stock market, but the 
elasticity is quite low and the explanatory power limited. Hence, holding foreign assets 
provides some diversification against fluctuations in the local stock market. Column (2) 
shows that the domestic bond return is also positively correlated with the aggregate return 
on foreign assets, but with an elasticity well below ½, which is again consistent with a 
diversification contribution from foreign assets.  
We turn to the subcomponents of the overall foreign asset position in columns (3)-(5). 
Column (3) shows that domestic stock returns are significantly positively correlated with 
returns on foreign portfolio equity assets (there is a substantial global component to stock 
market performance) but the point estimate of only 0.4 again signals the benefits from 
diversification. The correlations between returns on foreign portfolio equity assets and 
domestic debt (column 4), foreign debt assets and domestic debt (column 5), and yields on 
foreign debt holdings and domestic debt (column 6) are of the same order of magnitude.  -3 0-
Finally, we turn the relation between domestic- and foreign-currency ex-post real returns 
and exchange rates in Table 7.  In column (1), we report the correlations between 
domestic- and foreign-currency real returns on aggregate foreign assets. The mean 
correlation is actually negative: an increase in the local-currency real return is typically 
associated with a fall in the dollar real return, demonstrating the importance of exchange 
rate shifts in de-linking real returns across countries. As shown in column (2), domestic 
real returns are lower during periods of real appreciation. As noted earlier, this could be 
due to several mechanisms but is consistent with the returns on at least some foreign assets 
being driven by external factors. Column (3) shows a very strong positive correlation 
between dollar real returns on foreign assets and the real exchange rate, suggesting that at 
least some of the returns on foreign assets are driven by domestic factors.  
The correlation patterns on the foreign liability side are shown in columns (4)-(6). As 
shown in column (4), there is essentially no correlation between domestic and dollar real 
returns on foreign liabilities. The negative (positive) correlation between domestic (dollar) 
returns and the real exchange rate is also very high, in line with the pattern on the foreign 
asset side, and is consistent with a role for both foreign and domestic factors in 
determining returns on foreign liabilities. 
In summary, this section has provided an exploratory analysis of rates of return and yields 
for foreign assets and liabilities. Market indices co-vary significantly with these returns, 
but for certain asset categories there are substantial unexplained residuals. More precise 
information on cross-border investment patterns would be helpful in this regard. 
International cross-holdings appear to provide diversification against fluctuations in 
domestic market returns. Finally, the dynamics of real exchange rates imply that the 
properties of real returns are very different for home and foreign investors. 
 -3 1-
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
Our goal in this paper has been to highlight some empirical features of the growth in 
international cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities. In addition to describing the 
broad trends, we have identified growth in goods trade and stock market capitalization as 
two key co-variates of the growth in the scale of international balance sheets. Sorting out 
the lines of causality among these variables provides challenges for both theoretical and 
empirical researchers.  
We have also analyzed the properties of the rates of return on foreign assets and liabilities. 
The standard modeling assumption of a common ‘world interest rate’ on international 
investments is not supported by the data, which show rates of return varying over time and 
across asset classes. Better information on the composition of international portfolios 
would allow a more detailed investigation of this topic but we believe that the 
international investment position data provides a useful and fresh perspective on the 
international diversification literature. The study of higher-frequency data on rates of 
return would also be useful in modeling the international transmission of business cycle 
shocks. -3 2-
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APPENDIX. Data Sources 
 
IFIGDP  Sum of total foreign assets and liabilities (net of the value of derivatives) as a 
ratio of GDP.  Source: International Monetary Fund and national sources. 
 
GEQGDP Sum of total foreign equity assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. Equity is the 
sum of FDI and portfolio equity, and FDI is measured at book value. Source: International 
Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics, and national sources. 
 
GEQSHARE Share of foreign equity assets and liabilities in total foreign assets and 
liabilities. Equals the ratio of GEQGDP to IFIGDP. 
 
EXTLIB  Index of capital account liberalization. Range is (0,4) where 4 denotes complete 
liberalization. A value of zero indicates the presence of capital controls, obligation to 
surrender export proceeds, multiple exchange rate practices, and current account 
restrictions. Source: Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), updated by Mody and Murshid 
(2002). 
 
OPENNESS Ratio of exports plus imports of goods and services to GDP. Source: 
International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics (Penn World Tables version 
6.0 for Belgium). 
 
GDP per Capita  Measured in constant US dollars. Source: World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators Online Database. 
 
Financial Depth  Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Source: Beck, Thorsten, Asli 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (1999). 
 
Stock Market Capitalization  Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP.  Source: 
Datastream, Thomson Financial Inc. 
 
Cumulative Privatization  Ratio of cumulative privatization revenues to GDP. Source: 
OECD Privatization Database. 
 
Corporate Tax Rate  Average tax rate on corporate profits as calculated by Devereux, 
Lockwood and Redoano (2002). 
 
Investor Protection  Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a country has introduced a law 
prohibiting insider trading, and zero otherwise. Source: Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2001). 
 
Yields on external assets and liabilities: investment income payments/receipts in US 
dollars on a specific asset/liability category during year t, divided by the outstanding stock 
of the specific asset/liability at the end of year t-1. Source data for investment income 
flows and international investment positions: International Monetary Fund, Balance of 
Payments Statistics, and national sources. 
Capital gains on external assets/liabilities: difference between the change in the stock of 
the relevant external asset/liability between the end of year t  and the end of year t-1, and 
the corresponding capital flow during year t, as a ratio of the stock at end-year t-1. All -3 7-
variables measured in current US dollars. Source, International Monetary Fund, Balance 
of Payments Statistics, and national sources. 
 
Rate of return on external assets/liabilities: sum of yield and capital gain.  
 
Real exchange rate  Ratio of domestic CPI, expressed in US dollars (end-of-period 
exchange rate), to the United States CPI. Source: International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics. 
 
Domestic stock market returns Index of US dollar returns on the domestic stock market. 
Source: Morgan Stanley Capital International.  
 
World stock prices  World stock market stock market index. Source: Morgan Stanley 
Capital International. 
 
Stock return  (Portfolio Survey weights): weighted average of foreign stock market 
returns, with weights corresponding to the shares of portfolio equity assets invested in the 
corresponding stock markets, as reported in the 1997 IMF Portfolio Survey. 
 
Stock return  (FDI weights): weighted average of foreign stock market returns, with 
weights corresponding to the shares of FDI invested in the corresponding countries, as 
reported in the OECD International Investment Yearbook. 
 
Domestic bond return: Derived from 10-year Total Return Government Bond Index. 
Source: Global Financial Data. 
 
Bond return (Portfolio Survey weights): weighted average of foreign bond returns, with 
weights corresponding to the shares of portfolio debt assets invested in debt instruments of 
the corresponding countries, as reported in the 1997 IMF Portfolio Survey. 
 
Domestic short-term interest rate:  Three-month money market rates where available, or 
rates on proximately similar financial instruments. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
Annex Table 35. 
 
Domestic long-term interest rate: 10-year benchmark government bond yields where 
available or yield on proximately similar financial instruments. Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook Annex Table 36. 
 
Interest yield (Portfolio Survey weights): weighted average of foreign bond interest 
rates, with weights corresponding to the shares of portfolio debt assets invested in debt 
instruments of the corresponding countries, as reported in the 1997 IMF Portfolio Survey. 
 
Interest yield (BIS weights): weighted average of domestic and foreign bond interest 
rates, with the weights on the domestic and foreign components in proportion to the 
relative importance of domestic-currency and foreign-currency assets in total overseas 
lending by domestic banks. In turn, the foreign component is a weighted average across 
destination countries, in proportion to the geographical spread of overseas lending by 
domestic banks. The data on the overseas assets of domestic banks is from the BIS.-3 8-
Table A1. External assets and liabilities: data availability 
 
Country  Total FDI  Portfolio  equity Portfolio  debt 
Other 
investment 
Date  Start  End Start  End Start  End Start  End Start  End 
United States   1976 2001 1976 2001 1976 2001 1976 2001 1977 2001 
United Kingdom  1970 2001 1970 2001 1980 2001 1984 2001 1984 2001 
Austria  1980 2001 1980 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 1992 2001 
Belgium  1981 2000 1981 2000 1981 2000 1981 2000 1981 2000 
Denmark  1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2000 
France  1989 2001 1989 2001 1989 2001 1989 2001 1989 2001 
Germany  1980 2001 1980 2001 1980 2001 1980 2001 1980 2001 
Italy  1972 2001 1972 2001 1972 2001 1972 2001 1972 2001 
Netherlands  1982 2001 1982 2001 1982 2001 1982 2001 1982 2001 
Norway  1980 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 
Sweden  1982 2001 1982 2001 1982 2001 1982 2001 1982 2001 
Switzerland  1983 2001 1983 2001 1983 2001 1983 2001 1983 2001 
Canada  1970 2001 1970 2001 1970 2001 1970 2001 1970 2001 
Japan  1980 2001 1980 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001 1980 2001 
Finland  1975 2001 1975 2001 1975 2001 1975 2001 1975 2001 
Greece  1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 
Iceland  1986 2001 1986 2001 1986 2001 1986 2001 1986 2001 
Ireland  1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 
Portugal  1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1993 2001 
Spain  1981 2001 1981 2001 1981 2001 1981 2001 1981 2001 
Australia  1986 2001 1988 2001 1988 2001 1988 2001 1988 2001 
New Zealand  1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 
 -3 9-
Table 1. Change in external assets and liabilities, cumulative capital flows, and capital gains, 
1995-2000 (ratios of 2000 GDP) 
 
Note: the change in external assets (liabilities) is the difference in gross external assets (liabilities) 
between end-2000 and end-1995 (end-1996 for Portugal), as ratio of 2000 GDP. The impact of capital 
gains is the difference between the change in external assets (liabilities) and cumulative capital 
outflows (inflows) between 1996 and 2000 (1997-2000 for Portugal), also as ratio of 2000 GDP. 
  (1) (2) (3)  =  (1)-(2) (4) (5)  (6)=(4)-(5)















with FDI at book value 
United States  27.8  23.8 4.0 36.4 34.8  1.6
United Kingd.  144.1  145.2 -1.2 145.5 149.0  -3.5
Austria 53.7  70.9 -17.2 57.9 84.8  -26.9
Denmark 76.1  84.2 -8.1 60.0 85.3  -25.3
France 51.1  68.4 -17.3 64.3 55.1  9.1
Germany 49.9  72.2 -22.3 53.6 74.9  -21.4
Italy 50.1  56.4 -6.3 40.9 52.5  -11.7
Norway 76.8  79.5 -2.7 59.2 61.4  -2.2
Sweden 69.5  43.0 26.5 57.4 38.1  19.3
Switzerland 208.9  256.3 -47.4 208.1 201.4  6.7
Canada 31.1  37.6 -6.5 16.7 32.1  -15.4
Japan 7.1  4.0 3.1 -0.1 -7.4  7.3
Finland 74.3  99.6 -25.3 180.4 76.9  103.5
Iceland 31.9  33.5 -1.7 53.1 66.0  -12.9
Portugal 51.3  56.5 -5.2 83.8 85.9  -2.0
Spain 52.6  64.8 -12.2 51.6 69.2  -17.6
 
with FDI at market value 
United States  34.6  23.1 11.6 47.2 37.4  9.9
France 80.5  68.4 12.1 70.3 55.1  15.2
Netherlands 135.4  100.0 35.3 163.7 88.3 75.4
Sweden 130.1  43.0 87.1 97.0 38.1  58.9
Australia 19.7  17.4 2.3 22.0 39.0  -16.9-4 0-
Table 2 Panel Analysis of International Financial Integration, 1982-2001 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
0.29 0.06 0.04 -0.05  -0.06  0.08 0.05  External 
Liberalization  (5.3)***  (.69)  (.5) (.5) (.6) (.8) (.5) 
Trade openness    4.18 4.95 3.08 3.89 3.29 2.72 
    (3.2)*** (3.7)*** (3.71)***  (4.5)*** (3.63)***  (3.01)*** 
  2.65  1.56  2.76  2.82  2.71  Log GDP per 
capita    (2.5)**  (1.97)*  (3.51)*** (4.31)***  (4.06)***
Financial Depth     0.24  0.56  0.62  0.75 
     (1.58)  (1.68)  (1.88)*  (2.37)** 
   1.27  1.3  1.32  1.35  Stock market  
capitalization     (5.86)*** (6.18)*** (6.35)***  (6.95)***
    -1.65  -9.67  -9.92  Cumulative 
privatization      (.66)  (2.66)**  (2.87)***
     - 1 . 4 7   - 1 . 2 7   Corporate Tax 
Rate       ( 1 . 6 5 )   ( 1 . 4 )  
Protection        0 . 1 9  
        ( 1 . 4 )  
Adjusted R
2  0.17 0.35 0.39 0.69 0.72 0.7  0.7 
Number of obs.  78 78 78 72 64 49 49 
 
Note:  Dependent variable is first difference of the IFIGFP ratio. Fixed-effects panel 
estimation using averaged data for 1982-85, 1986-89, 1990-93, 1994-97, 1998-2001. White-
corrected t-statistics in parentheses. See text for definition of variables. -4 1-
Table 3 Panel Analysis of International Equity Integration, 1982-2001 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
0.17 0.03 0.02 -0.01  -0.01  0.04 0.03  External. 
Liberalization  (3.69)***  (.5) (.36)  (.5) (.2) (.9) (.71) 
Trade openness    2.35 2.96 1.10 1.53 1.45 1.33 
    (3.62)*** (4.88)*** (3.37)*** (4.58)*** (4.0)***  (3.37)*** 
  2.15  0.99  1.56  1.82  1.8  Log GDP per 
capita    (2.74)*** (3.65)*** (5.06)*** (4.98)***  (4.74)***
Financial Depth     0.02  0.07  0.08  0.1 
     (.48)  (.84)  (.96)  (1.3) 
   0.92  0.93  0.94  0.94  Stock market  
capitalization     (18.3)*** (17.4)*** (9.7)***  (9.52)***
    -1.5  -3.32  -3.39  Cumulative 
privatization      (1.55)  (1.76)*  (1.82)* 
     0 . 0 4   0 . 0 9   Corporate Tax 
Rate       (.16)  (.31) 
Protection        0 . 0 4  
        ( . 8 2 )  
Adjusted R
2  0.12 0.31 0.41 0.89 0.9  0.87 0.87 
Number of obs.  72 72 72 66 59 46 46 
 
Note: Dependent variable is first difference of GEQGDP (the ratio of foreign equity assets 
and liabilities to GDP). Fixed-effects panel estimation using averaged data for 1982-85, 
1986-89, 1990-93, 1994-97, 1998-2001. White-corrected t-statistics in parentheses. See text 
for definition of variables. -4 2-
Table 4 Panel Analysis of Gross Equity Share, 1982-2001 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02  -0.01  External. 
Liberalization  (2.92)***  (2.08)** (2.27)** (1.6)  (1.68)  (1.51)  (1.2) 
Trade openness    0.1  0.18  -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 
    (1.4) (2.5)**  (.55) (.38) (.35) (.34) 
  0.31  0.2  0.17  0.004  0.02  Log GDP per 
capita    (1.97)*  (1.83)*  (1.36)  (.03)  (.1) 
Financial Depth     -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -0.04 
     (1.57)  (1.34)  (2.04)*  (2.09)** 
   0.11  0.11  0.15  0.15  Stock market  
capitalization     (3.15)*** (3.54)*** (7.04)***  (6.45)***
    -0.58  0.93  0.99  Cumulative 
privatization      (1.96)*  (2.28)**  (2.15)** 
     0 . 0 3   0 . 0 2   Corporate Tax 
Rate       (.3)  (.82) 
Protection        - 0 . 0 2 1  
        ( . 9 4 )  
Adjusted R
2  0.12 0.12 0.19 0.53 0.48 0.69 0.69 
Number of obs.  70 70 70 64 57 44 44 
 
 Note:  Dependent variable is first difference of GEQSHARE ratio (the ratio of foreign equity 
assets and liabilities to total foreign assets and liabilities). Fixed-effects panel estimation 
using averaged data for 1982-85, 1986-89, 1990-93, 1994-97, 1998-2001. White-corrected t-
statistics in parentheses. See text for definition of variables. -4 3-
 
Table 5A. Rates of Return on Foreign Assets and Market Returns, 1982-2001 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Real ret.  Real ret. Real ret. Real ret. Real ret. Real ret. Real ret.  Real yld  Real yld 
  Port. Eq. Port. Eq. FDI bookFDI bookFDI mkt FDI mkt Debt Debt  Debt 
Global  Stock  Return  0.77   0.16   0.57      
 (14.1)***   (3.45)***  (8.43)***     
Stock  Return    0.74         
(Port. Survey weights)   (13.6)***        
Stock  Return    0.14   0.62     
(FDI distrib. weights)     ( 2 . 1 2 ) **   (7.33)***    
Bond  Return       0.49    
(Port. Survey weights)        ( 1 0 . 4 ) ***    
I n t e r e s t   Y i e l d         0 . 5 1    
(Port. Survey weights)         ( 1 0 . 2 ) ***  
I n t e r e s t   Y i e l d          0 . 4 3  
(BIS weights)          ( 7 . 4 0 ) ***
Adj R
2  0.62 0.60 0.14 0.12 0.58 0.51 0.43 0.42 0.35 
           
Number  of  observ.  138 138 217 157 56  56  157 158 112 
 
 
Table 5B. Rates of Return on Foreign Liabilities and Market Returns 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Real return  Real return  Real return  Real return  Real yield 
  Portf. equity  FDI (book)  FDI (mkt)  Debt Debt 
Dom  Stock  Return  1.04 0.12 0.45    
  (27.9)*** (2.55)**  (5.33)***    
Dom Bond Return        0.45   
     (8.20)***   
Dom Interest Rate          0.55 
      (12.1)*** 
Adj R
2  0.86 0.12 0.35 0.34 0.50 
Number of observ.  139 217 57  146 160 
 
* Panel regressions with country fixed effects (t-statistics in parenthesis). ** (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 0.05 (0.01) confidence level. See text for definition of variables.-4 4-
 
Table 6. Foreign Asset Returns and Domestic Market Returns 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
  Real return Real return Real return  Real return  Real return Real yield 
  For. assets  For. assets  Port.Eq. assets Port.Eq. assets Debt assets   Debt assets 
Dom Stock Return  0.12    0.37       
 (5.98)***    (8.37)***       
Dom Bond Return    0.45    0.42  0.47   
   (8.90)***    (3.94)***  (13.2)***   
Dom  Interest  Rate          0.47 
          (10.2)*** 
Adj R
2  0.15  0.52  0.36 0.11 0.55  0.42 
Number of observ.  220  205  137  125  144  158 
* Panel regressions with country fixed effects (t-statistics in parenthesis). ** (***) indicates statistical 
significance at the 0.05 (0.01) confidence level. See text for definition of variables. 
 
Table 7 Rates of Return and Real Exchange Rates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Assets Assets Assets Liabilities  Liabilities  Liabilities 
Correlations  (, )
US
tt rr ρ   (, ) tt rd r e r ρ (, )
US
tt rd r e r ρ (, )
US
tt rr ρ   (, ) tt rd r e r ρ   (, )
US
tt rd r e r ρ
Australia    0.16 -0.47 0.79  -0.21 -0.54 0.94 
Austria -0.02 -0.32 0.95    0.19 -0.20 0.92 
Finland  -0.10 -0.61 0.84    0.73 -0.36 0.37 
France   0.36  -0.59  0.54   0.60  -0.48  0.40 
Germany  -0.59 -0.74 0.98  -0.05 -0.29 0.97 
Italy  -0.01 -0.52 0.84  -0.34 -0.62 0.95 
Japan  -0.80 -0.96 0.93    0.66   0.24 0.88 
Netherlands  -0.45 -0.80 0.89  -0.36 -0.72 0.91 
Portugal  -0.04 -0.46 0.91  -0.34 -0.22 0.84 
Spain  -0.55 -0.78 0.94  -0.70 -0.79 0.96 
Sweden    0.17 -0.54 0.74  -0.22 -0.72 0.83 
Switzerland  -0.51 -0.78 0.93  -0.17 -0.63 0.87 
United  Kingd.  -0.45 -0.93 0.72  -0.48 -0.88 0.82 




tt rr are real returns on foreign holdings in domestic currency and in US dollars, respectively; 
drer is the percentage change in bilateral end-of-period real exchange rate vis-à-vis the US. 
Correlations calculated over time period 1982-2001 or shorter. -4 5-
  


































































Note: Figure 1 plots the aggregate sum of external assets and liabilities over aggregate GDP. 
Figure 2 plots the standard deviation of IFIGDP ratio. Countries in the sample are  the United 
States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, and Spain.  
 
 -4 6-









































Note: Sum of FDI and portfolio equity assets and liabilities, aggregated over sample countries, 
divided by aggregate GDP. Countries in the sample are the United States, United Kingdom, Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, and 
Spain.  
 -4 7-
Figure 4 International Integration: Finance versus Trade 
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Note: Data aggregated over United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, Finland, and Spain. - 50- 
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Note: Averaged data over 1997-2001. Correlation between portfolio equity share and rate of 
return is 0.60 for external assets, 0.80 (0.59 excluding Finland) for external liabilities.  - 51- 
 
Figure 10. United States: Rates of Return and Yields on Foreign Assets, 1983-2001 
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Figure 11 United States: Rates of Return and Yields on Foreign Liabilities, 1983-2001 
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Note: graphs plot nominal US dollar returns and yields on foreign assets and liabilities, with 
FDI at market value.  